In 1966, both of us came to the Communicable Disease Center (now the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC» as newly commissioned officers in the US Public Health Service. We were initiated into the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) and immediately were immersed in the EIS course, which facilitated our metamorphosis from bedside clinicians into enthusiastic, if inexperienced, epidemiologists. During the subsequent 2 years, one of us (W.S.) was assigned to work as a generalist in a state health department (Rhode Island) while the other (F.M.L.) had a more specialized position (bacterial diseases) at CDC. Nevertheless, both of us went repeatedly into the field on epidemiologic investigations. Somewhere along the way, we assimilated the defining concept that populations, as distinguished from individual patients, were important. As a consequence, our careers, as with those of many other EIS officers, were irrevocably changed.
At that time, malaria still was the CDC's first priority, and Langmuir's first real triumph was his insistence that cases of malaria be reported only on the basis of positive blood smears. As a consequence of this rigorous case definition, the number of reported cases fell dramatically (1) . In the absence of malaria, Langmuir then shrewdly suggested that CDC teams could be available to investigate any kind of epidemic. This was the birth of a mechanism for a broad range of epidemic aid assistance to the states that continues to the present day.
Although the provision of such epidemiologic aid seems axiomatic now, it was not so at the beginning. Indeed, epidemiologists trained to work in the "field" (that is, at the actual site of the epidemic or problem) were in short supply and there was initial competition from another federal agency, the National Institutes of Health. The National Institutes of Health and its predecessor, the National Hygienic Laboratory, had a proud history of communicable disease research and occasional field investigations. However, those field projects usually were investigator-initiated rather than responses to requests for immediate assistance. As Langmuir has recounted (2) , the creation of the Epidemic Aid Memorandum was an imaginative administrative device that helped the two institutions sort out their complementary functions. On the day that a request for assistance with a disease problem was received, the institution that organized a response sent out the memorandum to "all who need to know." It soon became evident that the CDC responded to most epidemic aid requests.
This public commitment to prompt responses made the paucity of field epidemiologists even more acute. Because skilled epidemiologists could not be recruited in sufficient numbers, it was decided to establish a training program. The rationale to justify such training was found in the international political tension at that time. The United States was engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union and in an actual war in Korea. The threat of biological warfare made it clear that the nation needed epidemiologists who were trained to respond to sudden outbreaks of disease. These new 
The EIS course
The month-long introductory course in July was designed to transform our focus from individual patients to the consideration of groups of people, i.e., from thinking solely about the individuals who were ill to analysis of entire populations. Langmuir gave the first lecture in the course, and he got right to the essence. We were instructed in the epidemiologist's fundamental technique: "long division," the calculaepidemiologists could learn their skills by investigating conventional outbreaks, thereby also strengthening the CDC's relationships with state and local health departments. Such close working relationships would be critical if epidemics introduced by biological warfare were to occur. This rationale was accepted and led to the authorization of a program to recruit and train field-savvy epidemiologists.
The distinctive name of the training program was coined by Joseph W. Mountin, Assistant US Surgeon General, the person most responsible for the creation of the CDC. During discussions on the need for a cadre of trained field epidemiologists, Mountin stated, "What we need is an Epidemic Intelligence Service." The term stuck. The first EIS class matriculated in 1951 and consisted of 22 physicians and one sanitary engineer. Through 1995, 2,122 persons have completed the 2-year EIS assignment. Table 1 summarizes the background of these officers; the large majority have been physicians, about 7 percent veterinarians, and the remainder a mixture of academic epidemiologists, statisticians, nurses, and other professional persons. Although Langmuir (2) expressed a definite preference for selecting physicians, since 1980 the entering EIS classes have represented a greater diversity of professional backgrounds (3). tion of rates that related cases of disease (the "numerator") to the measured population in which they occurred (the "denominator"). This was followed immediately by the reinforcing admonition that, unless we calculated a rate, we were not doing epidemiology. Although our chairs were not yet warm, the transition had already begun, and we were on our way to becoming EIS officers. The group to be analyzed, whether a community, school, or an assemblage at a church supper, had become our "patient."
The careful study of disease outbreaks was emphasized in the course because Langmuir believed that by working through the actual data of a specific epidemic one would best come to an understanding of principles (4) . The choice to study outbreaks rather than endemic disease was no accident. Outbreaks are acute events that compel attention by their inherent urgency. They were exactly the sort of problems that we recruits anticipated facing soon after completing the course. Another feature that lent the course veracity was the assignment of current or recently graduated EIS officers as leaders of the afternoon session groups into which the class was divided after the morning lectures. It was in these small sections that we tackled the data from actual outbreaks that had been fashioned into epidemiologic teaching exercises; they were the heart of the course. In these intimate give-and-take sessions, EIS veterans just back from field assignments taught not only numerical epidemiology but also the lore of how investigations were actually conducted on a daily basis. These experienced EIS officers emphasized ingenuity, flexibility, and resourcefulness as well as the palpable delight of analyzing a real problem through to its solution.
Langmuir extolled the rewards of such "shoeleather" epidemiology, and he compared it with traditional academic epidemiology that is practiced remote from the events. He emphasized the personal acquisition of raw data in the field: conducting face-to-face interviews, tracing the suspect food back to its origin, collecting specimens for laboratory analysis, pounding the pavement. Indeed, Langmuir so imbued the first EIS class with the shoe-leather approach that it is believed that they designed (in circumstances that now are beyond memory) a wry symbol for the EIS: the print of a shoe with a hole in the sole, worn through by persistent field investigations (figure 1). This logo remains the proud emblem of the EIS.
No discussion of the EIS course would be complete without some mention of the Oswego County food poisoning exercise. This exercise was the first problem presented in the course and was deceptively simple. In April 1940, an explosive outbreak of gastroenteritis followed a church supper in the small rural village of Lycoming in Oswego County, New York. An epidemiologic case study was developed subsequently, and during the first EIS course in 1951 Langmuir introduced the "Oswego Problem." This exercise has remained a fixture of the course. The exercise and its analysis of food-specific attack rates are an elegant example of thoughtful investigation and statistical analysis. That the diagnostic power of the shoe-leather epidemiologic method could be demonstrated in such a bucolic setting without the need for high-technology assistance continues to be alluring to those who recently have left work in hospital intensive care units. In 1972, Michael Gross, an EIS officer assigned to the New York State Department of Health, was in the vicinity and revisited the outbreak site in Lycoming (5). Somewhat surprisingly, he found several surviving principals who still remembered the event, and he took advantage of the opportunity to conduct his own shoe-leather investigation. The village health officer offered the new information that one of the food handlers had a small draining infection on her hand that could well have been the source of the staphylococcal contamination of the implicated ice cream, a question that had not been resolved by the original investigation. Gross was able to interview two of the three physician epidemiologists who investigated the outbreak. Although they remembered the epidemic as well as providing the food histories, they could not recall ever speaking with the village health officer. Lastly, each investigator recalled doing the entire investigation alone! Gross's historical foray adds an amusing postscript to a story familiar to hundreds of public health workers, because the Oswego Problem continues to be used globally as a teaching exercise in applied epidemiology.
Another key lesson that Langmuir emphasized was the robustness of the epidemiologic method, i.e., although its techniques had their origins in the study of communicable diseases, they were broadly useful irrespective of the nature of the problem. Langmuir introduced us to Goldberger and his classic epidemiologic studies of pellagra (6) . While doing so, he was careful to describe the pellagrins in their socioeconomic and cultural context. The effected population largely comprised dirt-poor farmers who had left their farms to work in cotton mills. They had given up their vegetable plots and chickens and now were captives of the company store, subsisting on a grim diet of grits, molasses, com mush, and fatty meat (sowbelly). The age and sex distribution of the cases was an unforgettable example of the analytic power of a properly done community-based study which showed compellingly that pellagra was not a contagious disease, as had been thought, but clearly was caused by a deficient diet.
Langmuir was a showman; he enjoyed the limelight and liked to perform. We still remember his orchestrating a "late breaker" during the 1966 EIS course. Gene Gangarosa and a then-current EIS officer, Alan Bisno, were teamed in investigating a salmonella outbreak that had started in New Jersey (Bisno's EIS assignment) and had been traced all the way to a fish processing plant on the shore of the Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories, Canada (7). Langmuir had arranged for a short-wave radio hookup to be piped into the lecture room and had the team in the field report periodically on its findings as the investigation progressed. In voices made scratchy by the short-wave transmission, Gangarosa and Bisno described the desolation of northern Canada and what information they had acquired to date. Langmuir quizzed the team vigorously and quickly honed in on the observation that the sewage-contaminated water used by the processing plant offered obvious opportunities for contamination of the fish. The scene was reminiscent of a vintage movie with Langmuir on stage holding a microphone, relaying questions from the class, and concluding with "good luck" and then "over and out." This bit of epidemiologic theater worked just as planned, drawing the recruit audience right into the action.
The course was designed as a total immersion experience; long days were spent in classes and epidemic problems were to be worked out at night. The recruits bonded with each other and the EIS tradition; we had made the transition from clinicians to nascent field epidemiologists. Langmuir repeatedly emphasized, however, that the month-long course served only as an introduction to the subject. Thus prepared, EIS officers were to really learn applied epidemiology during their 2-year assignments under the guidance of experienced epidemiologists ("learning by doing"). Nevertheless, we might be forgiven for feeling we were newly part of an elite corps and were just a bit cocky as we anticipated our own field investigations.
Epidemic aid
After completion of the introductory course, the EIS officers moved on to their assigned posts. Most remained in Atlanta and were affiliated with one of the specialty units based at the CDC; others were located at selected state and municipal health departments. Regardless, all were to be ready to be sent into the field on epidemic aid duty at any time "on the orders of the Surgeon General." Indeed, epidemic aid quickly became the defining concept of the EIS (8), distinguishing it from the largely desk-bound training provided by schools of public health.
Even on reflection, the epidemic aid mechanism appears audacious and risky. Novice epidemiologists were sent into the maw of ongoing epidemics with the reputation of a fledgling federal institution precariously balanced on their shoulders. Officers often were seen reading furiously about the putative disease in question while in transit heading toward the epidemic. Langmuir, however, had great faith that people would be able to do things well that they had not done before. This trust was empowering and provided the milieu in which already strongly motivated individuals performed to high expectations. However, enthusiasm and intensity can careen off course, so Langmuir also believed strongly in mentoring to provide checks and balances. No one was sent into the field without supervision from their home base. As in the investigation at Great Slave Lake, regular communication with the distant supervisor provided guidance and critique of the evolving investigation, suggestions as to how to manage the inevitable political and diplomatic snafus, as well as solace and encouragement when the first analyses did not pan out quite as clearly as had been hoped. Although the supervisor had the ultimate responsibility, the tone of the supervision was supportive, not authoritarian. Quite the contrary; the initiative of the field epidemiologist was encouraged and a brisk exchange of ideas was the rule.
This support mechanism is reminiscent of the timehonored structure of clinical house staff training programs where the intern has frontline responsibility for the patient but always under the guidance of more senior residents and attending physicians. Langmuir, of course, had participated in such a system while he was a house officer at the Boston City Hospital, and he readily acknowledged that his own experiences in the clinical setting substantially influenced his design of a
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The epidemic aid function was grounded, of course, in service. When a state requested assistance, it had a specific local problem. Langmuir believed that "Each epidemic aid call was an adventure and a training experience, even the false alarms" (2, p. 473). Whereas local officials were focused quite understandably on a resolution of their specific problem, the consultant EIS officers also brought a larger perspective. While solving the local problem, the officers often used the investigation to probe more general questions, addressing issues of disease causation as well as national concerns that transcended the borders of the state being assisted. This was the concept of research embedded within service. In contrast to the deliberate planning of prospective studies, epidemic investigations must be designed "on horseback" in the midst of the turbulence that usually swirls about such events. Some have dubbed outbreaks "natural experiments," but most epidemics wax and then wane without producing revelations. Natural outbreak experiments only later appear self-evident because an epidemiologist seized the circumstance in the field to pose a question and structure an investigation in order to learn something new. Langmuir reveled in these fleeting opportunities, and he was confident that his young and energetic epidemiologic strike force would go into the field and return with the "intelligence."
Notably, however, Langmuir's concept of applied epidemiology was utilitarian and not academic. No matter how elegant an outbreak investigation might have been, it was regarded as incomplete by itself. Langmuir insisted that each instance of epidemic aid conclude with practical recommendations for the control of the immediate problem and for the prevention of recurrences. A final report had to be written that defined the problem, described the methods of the field investigation, displayed the epidemiologic analysis, discussed the results, and presented the final conclusions and recommendations. These reports were a fundamental feature of the training program, obliging the officers to hone their epidemiologic judgement, thereby documenting that they had sufficient data to justify their public health decisions (3, 8) .
In discussing the type of person whom he was seeking to recruit to a life of field epidemiology, Langmuir said, "The hardy ones who remained [in CDC] were thus adventuresome, willing to explore and travel, interested in infectious diseases [and, today, noninfectious diseases also], and at least susceptible to an epidemiologically related career. Epidemiology gets in your blood. Not just the science of it, nor the sleuthing of it, but the service in it" (quoted in reference 12, p. 3).
The EI8 Conference
Langmuir's concept of field epidemiology at its best was demonstrated at the annual EIS Conference. In 1952, Langmuir established a spring conference that was modeled closely on national scientific research meetings and was designed explicitly as an essential training experience for his fledgling epidemiologists. Returning from their investigations in the field, EIS officers submitted abstracts of their most distinctive investigations that had been completed during the preceding year. Competent routine work rarely was sufficient to meet the acceptance standards of the program committee. Papers were polished to concise 10-minute presentations and were followed by a 10-minute open scientific discussion. Allocating equal time for discussion was considered essential to promote scientific give-and-take. Langmuir occupied a front-and-center seat in the large CDC auditorium during most of the 5-day conference. Many an officer grasped the podium a bit tighter on seeing the tall Langmuirian frame rise deliberately and stretch itself before the microphone, papers clasped to his chest, the deep voice about to ask a question that invariably went to the heart 'of the issue. Penetrating though his questions were, he preceded them invariably with positive reflection on an aspect of the investigation. The conference symbolized the standards to which Langmuir held field epidemiology: such epidemiology must be performed with scientific rigor, new information should be produced, and the results must be openly displayed and subject to constructive critique.
These traditions have been maintained, and the Spring EIS Conference continues to attract more than 1,000 registrants annually. In addition to current EIS officers and CDC staff, the conference is attended by a substantial number of EIS alumni as well as other epidemiologists who take an active role in the scientific discussions.
The role of the field epidemiologist
Among his many contributions, perhaps Langmuir's actions during the Cutter Incident encapsulated best the role of a field epidemiologist (1, 13) . Langmuir was at the center of the data-gathering, analysis, and policy-making activities. All the elements of applied epidemiologic practice were present in the "public health emergency room": a major public health crisis, the need to act wisely in full public view on the basis of preliminary data, the gathering of accurate data on disease occurrence, the timely analysis of these data, the communication of the results to all who needed (or wanted) to know, making the correct epidemiologic diagnosis, and instituting appropriate control measures. Langmuir's field epidemiology was a muscular epidemiology of action, vigorously engaged in active combat with eruptive disease. This was the epidemiology of William Farr, whom he much admired, and who, Langmuir wrote, "did not cleave to the neutrality that his office could have afforded. He presented his analyses with objectivity but then stated his own interpretations forcefully and argued fearlessly for his recommended changes regardless of what vested interests might be involved" (14, p. 14) .
LEGACY
Langmuir's long-term objective for the EIS program was to make it meet the needs of career epidemiologists who would serve at CDC, in other federal agencies, and in state and local health departments (1) . In this, he succeeded; 43 percent of EIS graduates have chosen government public service (table 2) , including 100 state epidemiologists, 16 state health commissioners, two CDC Directors, and one US Surgeon General (table 3) . Ironically, considering the careers of the authors of this paper, it was not a stated objective of the EIS program to send field epidemiologists into academia (2) . Yet, 12 percent of EIS graduates have joined the faculties of schools of medicine and public health; many have served as departmental chairs, one as dean of a medical school, and nine as deans of schools of public health. In addition, one has served as a university president and one as chancellor of a medical center. Many alumni have been elected to high office in professional and academic societies (table 4), including one alumnus who has served as President of the American Public Health Association and another who will succeed to that post in the near future. As befits a training program in which the graduates take pride, CDC maintains a directory of graduates that is updated and distributed annually. This seemingly modest compilation is used by many EIS graduates to keep abreast of colleagues and contributes to a sense of "esprit de corps" that remains long after active duty. The most active graduates participate in a loosely organized but strongly traditional alumni association that sponsors both an annual lectureship at the EIS Conference as well as a prize that is awarded for the year's best manuscript by an active EIS officer, thus reinforcing the training program's goals. Both distinctions are named in tribute and respect for Alexander D. Langmuir.
Subsequent cohorts of EIS officers have assumed the responsibility for teaching Langmuirian field epidemiology in the EIS course; so, too, have those who have extended the tenants of field epidemiology abroad in the CDC-supported annual epidemiology course in Talloires, France, and in the Field Epidemiology Training Programs ("Global EIS") in Australia, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (15) . Furthermore, in 1995, the European Economic Community initiated an annual training program in applied epidemiology that was modeled after the EIS program and is being directed by European EIS alumni (16) .
The role of EIS graduates in influencing the presentation of epidemiology to students in medical schools and schools of public health is more difficult to document. Anecdotes would suggest, however, that the excitement and illustrative value of epidemic investigation in the field often appear in courses taught by EIS alumni. Other influences are subtle and unexpected. For example, the authors recently found themselves as members of the Task Force on Adult Immunization of the American College of Physicians. Glancing around the table at the committee's first meeting, there was a sudden realization that all seven members were former EIS officers who were all still devoted to prevention in the Langmuir tradition.
Before the advent of Alexander D. Langmuir at the CDC, epidemiology in the United States had a single lineage; based largely in schools of public health, its orientation was studious and academic. Langmuir created a second lineage of applied field epidemiology, equally rigorous but by its nature more immediately related to intervention and control. A third lineage, clinical epidemiology, has evolved in recent years that is devoted to applying epidemiologic principles to clinical decision-making. EIS graduates also have made salient contributions to its development. All three traditions continue to grow and prosper to the
